Fake fines, tax and parcel texts: how SMS phishing borrows Morocco's public services
In 2026 the DGSSI, NARSA, the DGI and Bank Al-Maghrib all warned of messages using official names to steal card data. A look at the pattern and the defences.
Official figures, mass leaks and an SMS fraud wave show rising pressure on Moroccans in 2025–2026. The drivers, and what the state, firms and families must do.
Our own timeline lists far more events for 2025–2026 than for earlier years, but that reflects our coverage choices, not a measured trend, so we do not use it as evidence. Everything below comes from official statements, the press and vendor research.
In most years since 2021, Abdellatif Loudiyi, minister delegate in charge of the National Defence Administration, has given parliament DGSSI figures. The labels change ("neutralised", "handled", "detected", "recorded", "reported proactively"), so they do not form one curve:
Our reading: bulletins and notes mostly describe flaws in software the DGSSI tracks, so they measure its workload, not attacks on Moroccans. Still, that output nearly doubled in 2026 (968, against 511 in 2025 and about 640 in 2024), while interventions stayed in the same range: 134 field interventions in 2024, 109 direct interventions in 2025 and 123 from January to September 2026. The official data show a busier DGSSI and point to more pressure; they do not show a fivefold rise. The most worrying result: critical flaws in 31 of 72 public web applications evaluated in 2026 (our report).
Vendor data measure detections on their own customers. According to H24info, Kaspersky counted about 21 million attack attempts in Morocco in the first half of 2025. NETSCOUT recorded 75,624 DDoS attacks on Morocco in the same period, mostly against wireless carriers.
Mass leaks with a political message. On 8 April 2025, attackers presented by Le360 as Algerian hackers claimed CNSS files on about 2 million insured people and 500,000 companies. These are their own figures. The CNSS confirmed a leak and said many circulating documents were "false, inaccurate or truncated" (our story). Government spokesman Mustapha Baitas called the attacks criminal and linked their timing to the renewed US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Moroccan Sahara, according to the national portal.
Hespress then reported that DDOS 54, a group it described as Algerian, announced a 15-day campaign against government sites; this was the group's claim, with no official statement at the time (our story). In June 2025, the group Jabaroot DZ claimed the land registry. The DGSSI traced the data to tawtik.ma, the notaries' platform, and Le360 reported 713 notary accounts circulating on the dark web (our story). The Ministry of Justice categorically denied a separate claim by the same group on its databases, H24info reported.
Leaks through ordinary accounts. In April 2026, the OFPPT confirmed that nearly 100,000 My Way profiles, with names, phone numbers and CNI numbers, were exposed. Early analysis pointed to a legitimate account used fraudulently (our story).
Fraud using the state's name. In April 2026, the DGSSI warned of SMS about fake traffic fines, sent from +44 and +63 numbers, that asked for card details and the bank's OTP code. NARSA and the DGI issued similar warnings (our analysis). In July, Bank Al-Maghrib's director of banking supervision said fraudsters now prefer social engineering to attacks on bank systems, according to Hespress.
Law 05-20, adopted in July 2020, requires public bodies and vital infrastructure to report incidents and appoint a security officer, according to the DGSSI. The 2030 strategy followed in 2024 (our story). Le360 reported that Morocco reached 50th in the ITU index by 2021 and Tier 1, with 97.5 out of 100, in 2024. The ITU describes the index as assessing country "commitments". After the CNSS leak, the CNDP said using leaked data is unlawful and invited complaints.
From our experience in the field, the 2025–2026 rise is less a flood of attacks than a change of target. Attackers moved from firewalls to people: the accounts that open large databases, and the citizens who trust an SMS carrying an official name.
Institutions deserve credit. The DGSSI regularly reports figures to parliament and traced the Tawtik data within four days. The CNSS and the OFPPT confirmed their incidents. Bank Al-Maghrib now asks banks to generalise multi-factor authentication.
But a Tier 1 rating measures commitments, while critical flaws in 31 of 72 public applications measure practice. Changing definitions also make it hard for anyone, including the state, to know whether things are improving. Our priorities are short: strong authentication on every account that holds Moroccans' data, collecting less data, and comparable public reporting.