Independent cyber news · Morocco21 November 2026
MaroCyber
AnalysisHigh

Why cyber threats against Moroccans rose in 2025–2026, and what must change

Official figures, mass leaks and an SMS fraud wave show rising pressure on Moroccans in 2025–2026. The drivers, and what the state, firms and families must do.

Key points

  • The DGSSI figures given to parliament do not form a clean series. The clearest 2026 change is in alerts: 968 bulletins and notes, 373 of them critical, against 511 and 248 in 2025.
  • The bigger change is the kind of incident. From April 2025, leaks claimed or confirmed at the CNSS, Tawtik and the OFPPT exposed data on large numbers of Moroccans.
  • In 2026 the DGSSI, NARSA and the DGI warned of fraud borrowing official names, and Bank Al-Maghrib said fraudsters now favour social engineering.
  • The drivers we can document: more people online, politically framed hack-and-leak claims, cheap bulk SMS, stolen logins and weak public web applications.
  • Morocco has the laws and a top ITU rating. The gap is in daily execution.

A caveat first

Our own timeline lists far more events for 2025–2026 than for earlier years, but that reflects our coverage choices, not a measured trend, so we do not use it as evidence. Everything below comes from official statements, the press and vendor research.

What the official figures show

In most years since 2021, Abdellatif Loudiyi, minister delegate in charge of the National Defence Administration, has given parliament DGSSI figures. The labels change ("neutralised", "handled", "detected", "recorded", "reported proactively"), so they do not form one curve:

Our reading: bulletins and notes mostly describe flaws in software the DGSSI tracks, so they measure its workload, not attacks on Moroccans. Still, that output nearly doubled in 2026 (968, against 511 in 2025 and about 640 in 2024), while interventions stayed in the same range: 134 field interventions in 2024, 109 direct interventions in 2025 and 123 from January to September 2026. The official data show a busier DGSSI and point to more pressure; they do not show a fivefold rise. The most worrying result: critical flaws in 31 of 72 public web applications evaluated in 2026 (our report).

Vendor data measure detections on their own customers. According to H24info, Kaspersky counted about 21 million attack attempts in Morocco in the first half of 2025. NETSCOUT recorded 75,624 DDoS attacks on Morocco in the same period, mostly against wireless carriers.

What changed in 2025–2026

Mass leaks with a political message. On 8 April 2025, attackers presented by Le360 as Algerian hackers claimed CNSS files on about 2 million insured people and 500,000 companies. These are their own figures. The CNSS confirmed a leak and said many circulating documents were "false, inaccurate or truncated" (our story). Government spokesman Mustapha Baitas called the attacks criminal and linked their timing to the renewed US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Moroccan Sahara, according to the national portal.

Hespress then reported that DDOS 54, a group it described as Algerian, announced a 15-day campaign against government sites; this was the group's claim, with no official statement at the time (our story). In June 2025, the group Jabaroot DZ claimed the land registry. The DGSSI traced the data to tawtik.ma, the notaries' platform, and Le360 reported 713 notary accounts circulating on the dark web (our story). The Ministry of Justice categorically denied a separate claim by the same group on its databases, H24info reported.

Leaks through ordinary accounts. In April 2026, the OFPPT confirmed that nearly 100,000 My Way profiles, with names, phone numbers and CNI numbers, were exposed. Early analysis pointed to a legitimate account used fraudulently (our story).

Fraud using the state's name. In April 2026, the DGSSI warned of SMS about fake traffic fines, sent from +44 and +63 numbers, that asked for card details and the bank's OTP code. NARSA and the DGI issued similar warnings (our analysis). In July, Bank Al-Maghrib's director of banking supervision said fraudsters now prefer social engineering to attacks on bank systems, according to Hespress.

The drivers

  1. More Moroccans online. ANRT counted about 39.86 million internet subscriptions at the end of March 2025, nearly 93% mobile, Hespress reported. Our analysis: more banking, administrative and payment services online mean more accounts to steal and more official names to fake.
  2. Geopolitical hacktivism. The largest 2025 claims came from groups presenting themselves as Algerian, and the government read them politically. Our analysis: hack-and-leak gives such groups visibility at low cost, and even partly false files cause real damage.
  3. Cheap bulk SMS. In October 2026, Casablanca police arrested two suspected relays of a network that, according to Assabah via Le360, operated from China and used thousands of SIM cards to send texts in batches.
  4. Stolen logins. In March 2026, Kaspersky said it had found, without giving a period, more than 2.1 million credentials linked to Moroccan users or resources on the dark web, stolen by infostealers. Our analysis: the OFPPT and Tawtik cases show that access through real accounts is as dangerous as technical exploits.
  5. Fake tools and AI. Le360, citing Kaspersky data, reported malware aimed at SMEs disguised as ChatGPT, Microsoft Office or Google Drive. Experts quoted by Hespress in November 2025 said generative AI makes scams more convincing. We have seen no Moroccan figures measuring AI-made lures.
  6. Weak public applications. The 31-of-72 result shows how wide the attack surface still is.

What Morocco already has

Law 05-20, adopted in July 2020, requires public bodies and vital infrastructure to report incidents and appoint a security officer, according to the DGSSI. The 2030 strategy followed in 2024 (our story). Le360 reported that Morocco reached 50th in the ITU index by 2021 and Tier 1, with 97.5 out of 100, in 2024. The ITU describes the index as assessing country "commitments". After the CNSS leak, the CNDP said using leaked data is unlawful and invited complaints.

How Moroccan cybersecurity must improve

For the state and institutions

For companies and SMEs

For families

Opinion

MaroCyber's view

From our experience in the field, the 2025–2026 rise is less a flood of attacks than a change of target. Attackers moved from firewalls to people: the accounts that open large databases, and the citizens who trust an SMS carrying an official name.

Institutions deserve credit. The DGSSI regularly reports figures to parliament and traced the Tawtik data within four days. The CNSS and the OFPPT confirmed their incidents. Bank Al-Maghrib now asks banks to generalise multi-factor authentication.

But a Tier 1 rating measures commitments, while critical flaws in 31 of 72 public applications measure practice. Changing definitions also make it hard for anyone, including the state, to know whether things are improving. Our priorities are short: strong authentication on every account that holds Moroccans' data, collecting less data, and comparable public reporting.

Sources

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  9. NETSCOUTwww.netscout.com
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  12. Morocco national portalwww.maroc.ma
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